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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Brandon Wayne Estes appeals from the revocation of his probation. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Estes battered Kimberly Polley by biting her face in the course of a fight.  
(R., pp. 18-19.)  The state charged Estes with felony domestic violence, with a 
persistent violator enhancement.  (R., pp. 55-56, 60-62.)  Estes pled guilty to the 
domestic violence charge and the state dismissed the enhancement, and the 
parties agreed to sentencing recommendations which included probation and 
mental health court.  (R., pp. 172-73.)  The district court accepted the plea, 
imposed a sentence of six years with two and one-half years determinate, 
suspended execution of the sentence, and ordered probation.  (R., pp. 193, 198-
210.)  One term of probation was that Estes “enroll in, comply with, and complete 
all Mental Health Court programming requirements.”  (R., p. 208.) 
 Estes quickly violated the terms of mental health court by missing 
appointments, making threats, not taking urinalysis tests, violating curfew, and 
having unapproved associations.  (R., pp. 218-20.)  The state moved to revoke 
his probation for being terminated from mental health court and also violating 
additional conditions of probation.  (R., pp. 222-32.)   
 The district court arraigned Estes on the probation violation allegations, 
and notified him of his rights.  (R., pp. 237-38.)  The district court appointed the 
public defender, Estes denied the allegations, and the court scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing.  (R., p. 240.)  The evidentiary hearing was held on two days, 
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in which the court took evidence from both parties.  (R., pp. 256-58, 266, 271-74, 
280.)  The court thereafter entered a written memorandum opinion and order 
finding Estes violated the terms of probation.  (R., pp. 288-93.)  The district court 
rejected Estes’ claim that his termination from mental health court violated due 
process, concluding that the proceedings on the probation violation in the 
criminal case complied with due process requirements, and therefore Estes was 
not entitled to additional process before the mental health court.  (Id.) 
After a hearing on disposition (R., p. 312), the district court revoked 
probation and ordered the sentence executed (R., pp. 313-16).  Estes filed a 
motion for reconsideration under Rule 35, which the district court denied.  (R., 
pp. 318-24.)  Estes filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 326-29.)   
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ISSUES 
 
 Estes states the issues on appeal as: 
Issue 1: The Mental Health Court did not provide adequate 
due process when terminating defendant from 
diversionary program. 
 
Issue 2: District Court improperly decided disputed facts when 
revoking probation and imposing sentence. 
 
Issue 3: There was not substantial and competent evidence to 
support the mental health court’s decision to 
terminate defendant from diversionary program. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (verbatim).) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Estes failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded 
that Estes had been provided with due process? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Estes Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Concluded That 
Estes Had Been Provided With Due Process 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court concluded that the process afforded in the probation 
violation proceedings fully complied with due process requirements.  (R., 
pp. 288-93.)  The district court first found by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Estes had violated the terms of his probation by being terminated from 
mental health court for “threatening behavior, missed curfew, missed 
appointments, and … unapproved associations” and by being evicted from “My 
House” for “aggressive behavior towards other residents.”  (R., p. 289.)  The 
district court specifically rejected the argument that the due process requirements 
for revoking probation had to be complied with prior to, as opposed to after, 
termination from mental health court.  (R., pp. 290-93.)   
 On appeal Estes claims the district court erred, arguing that he had a 
separate right to be in mental health court and therefore a separate due process 
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to termination from that 
program.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-11.)  Review of applicable law shows that 
Estes was provided due process prior to deprivation of his probation liberty 
interest.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “Due process issues are generally questions of law.”  Idaho Historic 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council of the City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651, 
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654, 8 P.3d 646, 649 (2000).  The standard of appellate review applicable to 
constitutional issues is one of deference to factual findings, unless they are 
clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements have 
been satisfied in light of the facts found.  State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 
79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 
786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 
C. Estes Was Provided Due Process 
 
 “The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and 
United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process 
be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”  State v. 
Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827 (Ct. App. 2010).  A probationer 
“has a protected liberty interest in continuing probation, and is therefore entitled 
to due process before probation may be revoked.”  State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 
766, 171 P.3d 253, 257 (2007).  This “process is to be flexible, does not need to 
be equated to a separate criminal prosecution and may be informal,” but 
generally requires written notice, disclosure of evidence, an opportunity to be 
heard and present evidence, the right to confront opposing evidence, a neutral 
and detached decision-maker, and written statements as to the basis for revoking 
probation.  State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 743, 170 P.3d 881, 886 (2007). 
 The record establishes that this basic process was provided in the 
probation proceedings before the district court.  (R., pp. 222-32 (written notice of 
the probation violation allegations), 237-38 (arraignment and appointment of 
counsel), 256-58, 266 (day one of the evidentiary hearing), 271-74, 280 (day two 
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of the evidentiary hearing), 288-93 (district court written findings of fact).)  The 
district court rejected Estes’ argument that due process demanded this process 
be provided in the mental health court instead of (or in addition to) the criminal 
court.  (R., pp. 289-90.)  Application of the relevant law shows the district court’s 
decision was correct.     
 In State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 739, 170 P.3d 881, 882 (2007), Rogers 
was placed in drug court as a diversionary program after pleading guilty, 
meaning that the state would dismiss the case if Rogers successfully completed 
drug court.  Rogers violated several program rules, so the drug court judge 
terminated Rogers from the program without a formal hearing and then 
proceeded to sentencing.  Id. at 740, 170 P.3d at 883.  The Court articulated the 
due process issue relative to diversionary programs as follows:   
[w]here a defendant enters a diversionary program prior to entering 
a plea he maintains his right to assert his innocence and has no 
liberty interest at stake as expulsion from the program will leave 
him in the exact same position as he was before entering it. 
However, when a defendant pleads guilty in order to enter a 
diversionary program he has a liberty interest at stake as he will no 
longer be able to assert his innocence if expelled from the program. 
 
Id. at 741, 170 P.3d at 884.  Concluding that Rogers’ expulsion from the drug 
court diversionary program would result in a loss of his liberty, the Court then 
determined that “the liberty interest involved is akin to that in probation and 
parole revocation hearings” and therefore the same process as in those 
proceedings was due.  Id. at 742, 170 P.3d at 885. 
 The district court distinguished Rogers on the basis that mental health 
court in this case was not a diversionary program, as drug court was in Rogers, 
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but was instead a condition of probation.  (R., p. 290.)  The Court found “no 
cognizable reason” why due process requirements could not be afforded in the 
criminal case, as opposed to in the mental health court.  (R., pp. 290-91.)   
 The district court’s analysis is correct.  In Rogers the drug court was a 
diversionary program, meaning that upon his discharge Rogers went immediately 
to sentencing without any additional process.  In this case, because mental 
health court was a condition of probation, discharge put Estes back before the 
criminal court where he was afforded due process before any liberty interest was 
rescinded.  Because the record shows Estes was afforded the full due process 
rights to which he was entitled before he lost his liberty, there was no violation of 
due process. 
 Estes argues that his case is identical to Rogers because he too was 
“placed in a diversionary program” and his termination from mental health court 
“resulted in his being criminally sentenced and having a felony conviction appear 
on his record.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)  This argument is based on a false 
representation of the procedural history of this case.  As noted above, Estes was 
not put in mental health court as a diversionary program with the promise that the 
case would be dismissed.  Rather, he pled guilty and was placed in mental health 
court as a condition of probation.  (R., pp. 172-73, 193, 198-210.)  Because this 
case was a straight-up probation violation case, and the process due a probation 
violation was provided, Estes has failed to show error. 
 Estes next argues that because the district court lacked the authority to 
order him reinstated in mental health court that the proceedings in the criminal 
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court could not provide him due process.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.)  This 
argument confuses what liberty interest Estes had.  As noted above, a 
probationer “has a protected liberty interest in continuing probation, and is 
therefore entitled to due process before probation may be revoked.”  Rose, 
144 Idaho at 766, 171 P.3d at 257 (emphasis added).  Because the criminal 
court had authority to continue Estes on probation or to revoke that probation, 
Estes was afforded due process prior to losing his liberty interest.   
 Estes finally argues the district court lacked “substantial and competent 
evidence to substantiate the mental health court judges [sic] decision to 
terminate him from the program” because one of his several mental health court 
violations was missing an appointment scheduled prior to sentencing (compare 
R., p. 218 (Estes missed appointment on “the week of September 24, 2015”) with 
R., p. 198 (sentenced on September 28, 2015)).  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)  
Estes has failed to show error.  First, Estes has failed to establish the relevance 
of this argument.  The relevant condition of probation was that Estes “enroll in, 
comply with, and complete all Mental Health Court programming requirements.”  
(R., p. 208.)  Evidence that he missed an appointment just prior to sentencing 
was relevant to whether he had complied with this term of probation.  Second, 
Estes was not found in violation of his probation for a single missed appointment.  
The district court found Estes’ various failures regarding mental health court 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  (R., p. 289.)  Even excluding the 
single missed appointment, there was a plethora of evidence showing that Estes’ 
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expulsion from mental health court was justified for failure to obey the applicable 
rules.  (R., pp. 218-20.) 
 The district court concluded that Estes’ was provided due process.  
Because Estes was provided all the process due prior to terminating his 
probationary liberty interest, Estes has failed to show error by the district court. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
revoking probation. 
 DATED this 20th day of July, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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